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Abstract. The Five Greatest Kinds discussed in Plato‘s Sophist 
are taken to be just one instance of a fivefold structure found 
in various related texts. Contemporary linguistic theories are a 
source for ideas about its functioning.
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The Sophist is undoubtedly one of the most remarkable Platonic 
dialogues. The title anounces its main content but there is a wealth of 
tangential topics in the the text. If the sophist and the philosopher are 
presented in the contrast of darkness and light (254a), they are somehow 
correlated to non-being and being, a pair which attracts even more 
interest. The sophisticated and fascinating discussion may easily lead to 
forgetting that Plato wrote at a time when neither logic nor grammar1 were 
conceived as self-standing disciplines. Much of the dialogue revolves 
around linguistic issues and actually its methodological side might be 
considered as even more important than the substance. It was much later 
that ,sophist‘ became a disparaging qualification, just as being became an 
issue pertaining to religious ideologies that developed in post-Hellenistic 
times2. It was the success of Aristotle‘s categories that spurred Platonists 
to scrutinize their own canon with the Sophist becoming a „proof“ that 
Plato already had worked out the topic. Porphyry‘s rewriting of the four 
Aristotelian predicables as five visibly follows the schema of the Five 
Greatest kinds and this in turn would be a further argument to revisit 
Plato‘s original texts in such a perspective.
Besides generic studies of Plato‘s thought, the extent of comments 
on even this single dialogue discourages attempts at survey and reviewing 
the items just for this secondary topic is no mean feat3. A modest attempt 
will be made here to reconsider the fivefold schema from the Sophist and 
to trace some links and continuations in other texts e.g. the Philebus, 
1   Grammar (Γραμματική) in classical texts is nothing more than literacy (Graham 
2014).
2   Kahn C., Essays on Being (2009).
3   Cf. Ontology.co (online): an annotated bibliography on Plato’s Sophist  Part 1,Part 
2. and a few more recent references at the end of the present text.
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Timaeus4, and elsewhere. Seeing a pattern and establishing connections 
hopefully would help readings all related texts. Plato unambiguously 
states that understanding of which kinds and/or things (can) mix is crucial 
for activities like his own, pertaining to philosophy (253d). Just before 
launching the discussion about the five greatest kinds, his main protagonist, 
The Stranger, comments that „if we cannot grasp being and not-being 
with perfect clearness, we shall at any rate not fail to reason fully about 
them, so far as the method of our present inquiry permits“(254c). So, 
just understanding, what a set of notions such as the one from the Sophist 
allows to achieve, is the modest aim of the present inquiry.  
The Quincunx
The Five Greatest kinds (μεγίστα γένη) are introduced in two steps, 
starting with the remark that among them are surely being itself, rest and 
change (τό τε ὂν αὐτὸ καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις). Next are added the same 
and the different (τό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον) (254d-55b). Obviously there 
are two pairs of closely related terms and another one, single, which seems 





Presenting and describing them in this way emphasizes that the 
exact words do not matter as much as the structure that they form and 
which will be called conveniently a ‚quincunx‘. 
The naive explanation here amounts to a narrative and one may be 
even tempted to say ‚myth‘: the Same and the Different somehow mix, 
combine or blend, producing Being which is from two distinct types, 
either Rest or Change. Inverting the perspective Plato rather hints that 
there are two main principles (archai) that govern being which consists 
from a mix of sameness and difference. His exposition begins with the 
brief assertion that rest and change do not mix (252d) and the Stranger 
explains in detail that the change is „identical and different” (256b), “is 
4   Brisson’s contemporary classic “The Same and the Other in Timaeus’s Ontological 
Structure”(1974) treats much of  the same, moving in its own direction.
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not different and is different” and it is “with being and non-being” (256d). 
Disregarding nuances of language, it seems rather natural to object that 
the different and the identical are strong abstractions or some second order 
derivatives from forms of relation and their logical nature makes them 
antinomically distinct. Quite the opposite, rest and change are relative, 
especially when thinking about mechanical motion with our usual post-
Galilean understanding. 
This conundrum will disappear if one assumes the structure to be 
more important than the words in it, a move recalling the Saussurean 
solution which redrew the langue / parole contrast. 
Speech
That thinking and speech are the same (διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν, 
Soph. 263e; cp. Theaet. 189e, 190a; Phileb. 39a), is a commonsensical 
view that Plato endorses in his later works. However in the absence of 
formal theory, logic or grammar, the world becomes hoplessly entangled 
with features of language in ways which thought cannot trace. Even the 
simple – for us – distinction between correct, or „right“, and true5 is 
problematic. Today it seems evident that the 5 megista gene owe much 
to a crude linguistic theory. Its exposition is found towards the end of the 
Sophist (261d-263d), where the combination of nouns and verbs is said to 
form speech (λόγος), which can be either true or false. Two preliminary 
examples are outlined in text: the consonant and vowel sounds forming 
syllables or words, which are either meaningful or meaningless, i.e. 
available or not in the language that the literate person knows (253a). This 
is repeated with the mention of high and low notes, from which a melody 
or harmony is formed, pleasant or not, according to the judgment of a 
musician (253b).
The construction is obviously similar, so there is no proper discussion 
pertaining to it. The words onoma, rhema just as logos are rather vague 
and general6, still it is evident that here again there are two elements that 
are combined or mixed, and they produce or generate something else, for 
which a pair of opposite predicates is given:
5   No such distinction exists in mathematics.







The link between the athletic qualifications „true“, „false“ and the 
megista gene “same” and “different” is easily enough established. The 
specific terminology of the Sophist creates also a connection with the 
Timaeus, where the same schema is unambiguously recognized, albeit with 
some complications, as it is used there for the explanation of the world 
soul. “Same” and “different” are replaced by “indivisible” (αμέριστος; cp. 
Theaet. 205c) and “divisible” and they mix into the third essence (ουσία), 
which is that of the soul. It is here that arise either “opinions and beliefs” 







A similar construction is recognized in the Philebus,  mentioning 
also sounds and notes as in The Sophist and with the same order of 
exposition which is an inversion of the original appearance of the 5 
megista gene. A separate paragraph of the introduction (16f-d) sets out 
the general framework of the subject under consideration, and details 
come a few pages later. Socrates seems to recall the schema: “we said, it 
seems to me that a god reveals to us, now the infinite nature of things, now 
theirs limitation ”(23c7); after acknowledging the existence of a mixture, 
he proposes to his interlocutor “to think about the reason for mixing 
between the limited and the infinite and to add it as the 4th genus ”. And 
the interlocutor shrewdly asks him: “do you think you will also need a 5th 
genus to be the cause of separation?” (23f) Socrates at this point diverts 







The rhetoric that supports this construction is hardly convincing, 
asking whether “the creative agent always naturally leads, and that which is 
created follows after it...?” (27a). If in the naturalistic attitude the presence 
of causes is accepted only when they are manifested, in the repertoire of 
Platonism, reasons that have not yet caused anything would stand quite 
naturally. In the Philebus, Plato sketches something like a theodicy and 
this explains why the 5th component of the schema is not discussed, 
only hinted at, though its destructive nature is sufficiently obvious. The 
correspondence between the Philebus and the Sophist was noted already 
by Plutarch (Moralia 27), but the idea remained unpursued as it would 
lead to a dualistic philosophy (respectively: “heresy”). It was reconsidered 
again some hundred years ago by Paul Natorp but he also rejected it on the 
basis of content without noting the structuring.7 Charles H. Kahn calls the 
passage in the Philebus “cosmology” and acknowledges that mixing and 
separation appear together in the Sophist (243b5), but his opinion is that 
an additional principle, a fifth component, is not needed.8 
Continuations
Another quincunx, perhaps more controversial, can be found in 
the apocryphal Seventh Letter (342a). The text demonstrates enviable 
awareness of Plato’s manner of thinking, so the identity of the author does 
not actually matter here: one could talk about “transformation” or about a 
“misunderstanding”, according to views on authorship.
In this passage components of knowledge are listed and because 
they are again a total of 5 in number, they can obviously be arranged once 
more in quincunx, though this time the narrative is somewhat different. 
The scheme is described as “3 + 2”, three factors which lead to knowledge 
and its object itself with a special emphasis how the last two, referred to 
as 4th and 5th, differ from the first three. Reconstruction in the spirit of 
the current proceedings would point out that the name and definition refer 
7   Natorp (1921) Platos Ideenlehre; transl., Plato‘s Theory of Ideas (2004), 300-3.
8   Kahn C., (2013), Plato and the Post Socratic dialogue, 167 n. 19.
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to the object for which adequate knowledge and inadequate image are 
possible (the approach here being much like Laws, X 895d):
name
  (1) object   
(5) 
knowledge





   (3)
There could not be much doubt that author behind this exposition 
is aware of the fivefold structure, even if he might be not Plato9. There 
are further grounds to suppose that such constructions are not just an 
inevitable coincidence in the works of Platonizing philosophers. Plato‘s 
quincunx can be recognized in Porphyry‘s Isagoge and this touches the 
intriguing question how the violence done to Aristotle’s text came to be so 
passively accepted. 
In the Topics Porphyry had found the 4 predicabilia (idion, genos, 
symbebekos, horos) and disregarding the logic of their system replaced 
the last item with two: „species“ and „difference“. He does not expose the 





However there is a complete misunderstanding of the original intent. 
Aristotle, while developping his logic, discovered the logic squares: a pair 
of independant predicates generates 4 cases. Most conspicuous examples 
of its application are the 4 elements, 4 causes, 4 types of propositions. The 
4 predicables are unmistikably arrived at through the same process e.g. 
cobining the pair intrinsic/extrinsic with singular/nonsingular: 
9   Brisson supports authenticity while Frede and Burnyeat have published The 











Actually the invention of the logic square is a major achievement 
and today there is a vast literature on such constructs (and a biannual World 
Congress since 2010). Plato‘s musing about the philosopher knowing 
what does mix could be reworded as knowing independent predicates that 
will produce 4 cases. On the one occasion when 5 components had to 
be co-present Aristotle obviously knew how to proceed logically: a new 
predicate halved the universe into immutable and mutable realms with the 
4 elements exhaustively describing this last part. History however inverted 
their order and so the name “quintessence“ was adopted: 
            mutable         immutable
     fire   air     aether
(“quintessence“)   water   earth
Plato‘s linguistics
Ultimately, outside of Plato’s text the quincunxes do not have 
any particular value and they should be seen best as an idiosyncrasy 
of his.10 The case about logos (Soph. 261-3). however appears to be an 
important exception as it indisputably captures a basic understanding of 
the language phenomenon. Gathering Plato’s remarks from various places 
allows to eventually produce an even more pertinent structure. Even if it 
does not occur anywhere as a whole it would eventually summarize his 
views, while making conspicuous the absence of a key concept, that of a 
linguistic sign. One would have to go through the detail of contemporary 
semiotics and check what plausibly Plato had already guessed, which is 
not really feasible here. His writings hint at a development from a naive 




paradigm of „naming“ to understanding propositional constructs. The 
relation of a name to its referent is not the same for proper and common 
names, so referring is not same as meaning; while meaning can be arrived 






The important point of the Sophist, the understanding of speech 
(logos), on the one hand, as a blending or combination and, on the 
other, as truth, suggests how to deal with what is called “non-being”: 
“we will not fully agree, but only to the extent that the affixed “no” and 
“not at all” reports some difference in the names in question or rather 
the objects in connection with which the names of the negative statement 
are then pronounced (απόφασις)“ (Soph. 257c). Another name is derived 
from the name, a negation is applied to the concept and it is understood 
through the objects that would be included in its scope. Disentangling the 
Parmenidean problem in the dialogue is seen to occur mainly through the 
analysis of language with the Greatest kinds only indirectly contributing. 
The explanation of speech with an interplay of 5 components is indeed 
most illuminating.
Aristotle in his On Interpretation is seen to have exposed the basics 
of a cognitive or semiotic conception that remains as the received view 
even today. Nearly a hundred years ago Ogden and Richards gave its 
popular graphic representation as a „triangle of reference“ or „semiotic 
triangle“ but they did not add anything substantial to it.  „Just as all men 
have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, 
but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same 
for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images 
(De Interpr.  I.4). Words, mental states, things (or states of affairs) appear 
to form a single structure even if it is readily seen to break down into three 
pairs of elements. Charles Morris  suggested that with respect to signs 
there would be three separate directions of study, known as semantics, 
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syntax and pragmatics.11 Language, being a historical product, is found 
to contain idiomatic constructions that are syntactically incorrect or even 
meaningless. More generally, separating semantics from syntax for natural 
languages turned out to be rather difficult, so ultimately it is the empirical 
study of language use which decides about acceptable and unacceptable 
expressions, between sense and non-sense. These proposition can be 





Undoubtedly, the elements of modern semiotics can be seen among 
Plato’s considerations, and his five-element scheme will do well enough 
to represent its structuring.
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